Using Game Theory to Study the Evolution of Cultural Norms by De, Soham et al.
Using Game Theory to Study the
Evolution of Cultural Norms
Soham De1, Dana S. Nau1,2, and Michele J. Gelfand3
1Department of Computer Science
2Institute for Systems Research
3Department of Psychology
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
{sohamde, nau}@cs.umd.edu, mgelfand@umd.edu
March 20, 2017
Abstract
We discuss how to use evolutionary game theory (EGT) as a framework for studying
how cultural dynamics and structural properties can influence the evolution of norms
and behaviors within a society. We provide a brief tutorial on how EGT works, and
discuss what kinds of insights it can provide. We then describe three published studies
in which we have developed EGT models that help explain how structural and external
conditions in a society affect the emergence of social norms.
1 Introduction
Understanding human behavior and modeling how cultural norms evolve in different human
societies is vital for designing policies and avoiding conflicts around the world. In this paper
we discuss ways to use computational game-theoretic techniques to gain insight into why
different human societies have different norms and behaviors. In particular, we will use
evolutionary game-theory (EGT), which was originally developed to model the evolution of
biological life forms, but also is useful for understanding the evolution of human cultures.
EGT models typically deal with a large population of individuals that interact with
each other. Different individuals have different strategies, hence their interactions lead to
different game-theoretic payoffs—which are used to represent the individuals’ evolutionary
fitness. Individuals with higher fitness (or lower fitness) will be more likely (or less likely,
respectively) to reproduce, hence the strategies used by those individuals will become more
prevalent (or less prevalent) in the population. In a biological model, an individual’s strategy
might represent its species; in a cultural model it might represent a particular kind of
behavior. Thus, EGT offers a simple framework for studying the evolution of populations,
without requiring the decision-theoretic “rationality” assumptions that are typically required
in classical game theory models.
One of the limitations of EGT models is that they deliberately omit large amounts of
detail. In EGT models of biological evolution, they ignore most of the factors that might
influence whether a particular individual will reproduce successfully, and instead consider
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all individuals of a species to be equivalent. Similarly, EGT models of cultural evolution
ignore most of the complexities of human interactions. For example, rather than reasoning
about the physical outcomes of an interaction among several individuals, these outcomes
are represented by payoff values. Because the models are highly simplified, they don’t give
exact numeric predictions of what would happen in real life.
Another problem is that it isn’t always easy to get the model right. In EGT research, the
authors usually need to be very careful in developing their models, and must convincingly
justify their models in their research publications.
On the other hand, a good EGT model can provide explanations of the underlying dy-
namics of an evolving system, and establish support for causal relationships. Consequently,
such models can provide a useful complement to empirical studies, in which there may be
questions whether or not a correlation among various factors indicates a causal relationship
[1].
In this paper, we begin by providing a tutorial introduction to EGT. We follow this with
a description of several cases in which we have used EGT to show how various aspects of
a society’s structure or its environment can influence the evolution of behaviors and norms
within the society. These include: showing that strength of ties and mobility in a society
critically affect the evolution of third-party punishment, showing that societal threat directly
controls the strength of evolving social norms in a society, and showing that mobility plays
a crucial role in the evolution of ethnocentrism.
2 Background
2.1 Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) was first developed as an application of game theory to
evolving populations composed of multiple animal species, as a way to model how each
species’ evolutionary fitness causes its proportion of the population to grow or shrink [45].
The idea is to represent an interaction among animals as a normal-form game. The game’s
payoffs are intended to represent the effect that the interaction will have on the individuals’
evolutionary fitness. For example, if two animals fight over a piece of food, one might expect
that each individual’s fitness would be affected by how the fight affects the animal’s health,
and whether the animal gets the piece of food.
Rather than developing a detailed model of each specific individual, EGT models typ-
ically are at a much more abstract level that does not distinguish among the individuals
within each species, but instead looks at the average behavior of all individuals of that
species. More specifically:
• If the population is composed of n different species, then for each species i (i = 1, . . . n),
all individuals of species i have the same strategy si, namely the strategy of being a
member of species i. This strategy is intended to encompass—in an abstract way, of
course—everything that might affect this species’ average evolutionary fitness: size,
aggressiveness, sensory abilities, intelligence, etc.
• Each species i constitutes some proportion xi of the entire population, with
∑n
i=1 xi =
1. If we choose an individual at random, then for i = 1, . . . , n, the probability that
this individual uses strategy si is xi.
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Now, consider an interaction (e.g., a conflict over a source of food) between two individuals:
one from species i and one from species j. For simplicity of presentation, we’ll restrict this
to just two individuals, but it can easily be generalized to interactions among k individuals
for arbitrary k.
To formulate this interaction as a normal-form game, let us say that the individuals’
expected payoffs are u(si, sj) and u(sj , si), where “payoff” means the effect that the inter-
action will have on the individual’s evolutionary fitness.
The normal-form game is symmetric, i.e., if we name the two individuals a and b, then
it doesn’t matter whether the one with strategy si is individual a or individual b. In either
case, this individual’s expected payoff is u(si, sj), and the other individual’s expected payoff
is u(sj , si).
Suppose an individual with strategy si meets another individual chosen at random. Then
for j = 1, . . . , n, the other individual’s strategy is sj with probability xj . Hence the expected
payoff for the individual with strategy si is
∑n
j=1 xju(si, sj). Earlier, we said the expected
payoff is intended to represent the interaction’s effects on evolutionary fitness. The idea is
that species i’s expected payoff is higher than that of the entire population, then species i
will reproduce at a higher rate, hence its proportion xi will increase. If species j’s expected
payoff is lower than that of the entire population, then species j will reproduce at a lower
rate, hence xj will decrease.
The best-known way to model this is the replicator dynamic [46]. The original version
is a differential equation that assumes an infinite population and continuous time. Let
pii(x) ≥ 0 be the average payoff obtained by individuals of species i when the proportions
of each species are x = (x1, . . . , xn). Then the average payoff for the entire population is
θ(x) =
∑n
i=1 xipii(x). According to the replicator dynamic, the rate of change in each xi is
given by the following differential equation:
dxi/dt = xi(pii(x)− θ(x)).
The replicator dynamic is consistent with the Lotka-Volterra equations for the dynamics
of biological systems. Indeed, the replicator dynamic is mathematically equivalent to a
generalization of those equations [37].
The replicator dynamic can be translated into a difference equation in which the popu-
lation is finite, and time proceeds as a sequence of discrete iterations [30]. This formulation
can be used to run a discrete-event computer simulations and look at their outcomes—which
is useful if the differential equations are too complicated to solve mathematically.
One big limitation of the above approach is that it assumes that the species are well-
mixed, i.e., that they are uniformly distributed geographically. Such an assumption is often
inaccurate; there are many settings in which an individuals’ location can make a huge
difference in what interactions they have, and how those interactions affect their evolutionary
fitness. To model such situations, it often is useful to locate the individuals in a network in
which they are restricted to interact with their neighbors. We’ll discuss this further in the
next section.
2.2 Modeling Cultural Evolution
EGT can be used to model aspects of the evolution of human cultures. Here, strategies
correspond not to collections of individuals, but instead to possible behaviors. A successful
strategy—i.e., a behavior that produces good results—is likely to be adopted by others,
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Figure 2: (a) direct punishment, and (b)
third-party punishment.
hence become more prevalent in the population. Conversely, the prevalence of an unsuc-
cessful strategy is likely to decrease. The propagation of these strategies corresponds not to
biological reproduction, but instead to cultural transmission, in which humans imitate oth-
ers and learn from others. Rather than the replicator dynamic, here the evolutionary model
is a comparison process, e.g., a modified version of the Fermi rule from statistical mechanics
[5]. At each iteration t, each individual i uses some strategy in a game-theoretic interaction
and receives a payoff pii. Then, before the beginning of iteration t+ 1, i compares pii to the
payoff pij received by a randomly chosen neighbor j, and decides whether to keep using the
same strategy that it used before, or switch to the neighbor’s strategy. The probability of
switching is given by a version of the well-known sigmoid function (see Figure 1):
Pr[i switches to j’s strategy] = 1/(1 + es(pii−pij)),
where pii and pij are i’s and j’s payoffs in the current iteration, and s ≥ 0 is an arbitrary
constant called the selection strength. The Fermi rule can easily be adapted to situations
in which the population isn’t well-mixed (see the discussion at the end of Section 2.1). For
example, we can locate the individuals at the nodes of a network, restrict each individual i
to interact only with its neighbors, and restrict i to compare its payoff with the payoffs of
its neighbors.
Usually the Fermi rule is modified by introducing an exploration dynamic that is some-
what analogous to biological mutation. In biological evolution, mutation occurs so rarely
that game-theoretic biological models often omit it. In cultural evolution, an analogous
phenomenon happens more frequently: individuals to try out new behaviors [47]. The ex-
ploration dynamic models this as follows: when each agent i chooses what strategy to use
at the next iteration, there is a small probability µ that i will choose a strategy s at random
from the set of all possible strategies, regardless of whether s was a successful strategy for
the agents who used it in the current iteration, or whether any agent even used it at all.
2.3 Tutorial Example
Many kinds of human interactions have been modeled as social dilemmas in which there is a
conflict between behaving responsibly to help maintain a publicly-available resource—e.g.,
to avoid depleting a renewable resource such as grazing land, fishing stock, clean air, potable
water, or climate stability—or to misuse the resource and thereby improve one’s own payoff
at the expense of others.
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The Public Goods Game (PGG) [24, 6, 44] provides an abstract model of the above
dilemma. In this game, k participants are chosen at random from the population, and
each is asked to contribute an amount c to a common pool. There are two pure strategies:
Cooperate (i.e., contribute) and Defect (don’t contribute). The sum of all the contributions
is multiplied by a factor b > 1 that represents the benefit that the public good provides to
the participants, and the resulting amount is distributed equally to all of the participants,
regardless of whether they contributed.
If m of the k participants cooperate, then each cooperator’s payoff is bcm/k − c. If suf-
ficiently many participants cooperate, all participants will get more than they contributed.
However, as in the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game,1 the payoff for cooperation is lower
than the payoff for defection, which is bcm/k. Consequently, when the PGG is played
repeatedly with any of the evolutionary dynamics discussed earlier, defection spreads to
include nearly 100% of the population,2 and everyone’s payoff is near zero.
What’s missing from the above model is a way to sustain cooperation. One of the most
likely candidates is punishment. There is substantial evidence that humans are eager to
punish those who harm them and that punishment can help sustain cooperation [15, 24, 6].
If we allow defectors to be punished by those that they harmed (see Figure 2(a)), then
the expected payoff for defecting might be smaller than that for cooperating, in which case
cooperation will have evolutionary advantage over defection.
To model punishment of defectors, let us say that for each PGG participant i who
defected, another randomly chosen participant j will have an opportunity to punish i, by
subtracting a fixed amount ρ > 0 from i’s payoff. To do this realistically, the model needs to
include a cost for performing the punishment [25]: if j chooses to punish, then j will incur
a cost λ (with 0 < λ < ρ).
In this model, each individual’s strategy now consists of two choices: whether to coop-
erate if asked to do so, and whether to punish a defector if asked to do so. Thus there are
four pure strategies:
• CP (Cooperation with Punishment of defectors);
• CN (Cooperation with Non-punishment of defectors);
• DP (Defection with Punishment of defectors);
• DN (Defection with Non-punishment of defectors).
Unfortunately, there are several problems with this model. One is that the model of pun-
ishment is incomplete because it doesn’t include the possibility of punishing cooperators
although that phenomenon has been observed in human societies [26]. That problem is
relatively easy to fix, but another problem is more serious: why do individuals punish at
all?
Since punishing incurs a cost, those who punish will have slightly lower payoffs than those
who don’t—so over time, the group will evolve to nearly 100% non-punishers (strategies CN
and DN). As the proportion of punishers decreases, the average payoffs to defectors will
become higher than the average payoffs to cooperators—so as before, the population will
1 Indeed, when k = 2 the PGG is equivalent (under standard utility theory) to the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
i.e., there is a positive affine transformation [32, Section 1.3].
2The reason for the word “nearly” is that the exploration dynamic keeps the fraction of punishers below
1− µ.
5
evolve toward nearly 100% defectors, and each participant’s average payoff will be close to
zero.
Game-theoretically, this presents a problem. One can argue informally that individuals
continue to punish because it helps to maintain cooperative norms, but the model doesn’t
show how that happens. This was a problem in the EGT literature for some number
of years, until it was solved in 2012 by incorporating an observation that sometimes an
individual’s decision how to behave isn’t an absolute one, but instead is opportunistic, i.e.,
swayed by information about whether misbehavior will be punished [14, 28]. One way to
model opportunistic behavior is to have a probability 0 ≤ ι ≤ 1 that a participant in the
PGG will be informed, just before the contribution phase, of the punishment reputation of
the individual who will observe them, i.e., whether or not this individual punishes defectors
[29]. In this case there are four cooperation strategies:
• Cooperate;
• Defect;
• Opportunistically Cooperate (OC), i.e., behave opportunistically if told the punishment
reputation, and cooperate otherwise;
• Opportunistically Defect (OD), i.e., behave opportunistically if told the punishment
reputation, and defect otherwise;
where “behave opportunistically” means to cooperate if one knows one will be punished for
defection, and defect otherwise.
During the punishment phase, each individual has an opportunity to observe another
individual’s behavior, and decide whether to punish them. There are four punishment
strategies:
• Responsible punishment (punish defectors but not cooperators);
• Antisocial punishment (punish cooperators but not defectors);
• Spiteful punishment (punish everyone);
• Non-punishment (punish no one).
In this model, the strategy space is much more complicated than it was before. Each
individual’s strategy is a combination of one of the cooperation strategies and one of the
punishment strategies, hence there is a total of 16 possible pure strategies. Evolutionary
simulations show that with this model, populations converge toward a high proportion of
cooperation (mostly of the opportunistic kind) and responsible punishment [29].
3 Three EGT Studies of Cultural Evolution
We now describe three published studies of how structural and external conditions affect
the emergence of social norms [40, 41, 10]. We focus on explaining the design decisions: how
we chose to model things, and why.
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3.1 Evolution of Third-Party Punishment
Motivation. In Section 2.3 we discussed the question of why direct punishment should
exist, since it incurs a cost to the punisher. In third-party punishment (3PP), an individual
A harms another individual B, and an uninvolved third party C punishes A for causing that
harm (see Figure 2(b)). There is significant empirical evidence that humans [11, 4] and
non-human species [39] are willing to engage in 3PP, but this is even more of a puzzle than
direct punishment: not only does it incur a cost to the punisher, but the punisher was not
involved in the original interaction.
Since the work described in Section 2.3 showed that punishment reputation was a key in-
gredient in the evolution of responsible direct punishment, we decided to investigate whether
punishment reputation could also account for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Below we
summarize the results of that investigation (see [40] for details).
We began with the model in Section 2.3, and modified it as follows:
• For the contribution phase, we changed the game to a cooperation dilemma (the special
case k = 2, as discussed in Footnote 1) between two individuals.
• For each individual in the cooperation dilemma, we allowed an uninvolved third party
observe that individual’s behavior and decide whether to punish them—hence 3PP
rather than direct punishment
• The four punishment strategies were the same as in Section 2.3, except that the
punishment was 3PP as described above.
• The opportunistic strategies look at the punishment reputations of the individual’s
neighbors, and decide whether to cooperate by looking at the expected payoffs for
cooperating and defecting.
• The punishment reputations of the neighbors are always available, making the OC and
OD strategies identical. Hence there are just three pure strategies for contribution:
Cooperation, Defection, and Opportunism.
Next, drawing on classic sociological and psychological theory, we hypothesized that
social-structural constraints in human populations might play a crucial role in enabling the
evolution of responsible 3PP. The constraints that particularly interested us were strength-
of-ties and residential mobility, which have wide-ranging consequences for humans [20, 35,
34].
We hypothesized that punishment reputation was more likely to incentivize cooperation
and responsible 3PP in situations where there was high strength-of-ties (individuals inter-
acted primarily with a small group of other individuals) and low residential mobility (no
individual would be able to exit the group easily).
As a basis for modeling strength-of-ties and residential mobility, we began by locating
the individuals as nodes on a network (see the discussion at the end of Section 2.1). We used
Watts-Strogatz small-world networks [48]. On this network, we implemented strength-of-ties
and residential mobility as follows:
• Strength-of-ties. Granovetter [20] measured tie strength between two humans in terms
of how often they interacted with each other during a period of time. In our EGT
model, each individual generally has an equal number of interactions at each iteration,
so an individual with few connections has a relatively high number of interactions with
7
 
 
Figure 3: Effects of strength-of-ties (a) and mobility (b) on the proportions of cooperators
and responsible 3rd-party punishers. Long run average proportions were attained by aver-
aging 100 simulation runs over 5000 generations for populations of 1000 individuals, with
cooperation contribution c = 1, cost λ = 1 to punish, punishment penalty ρ = 3, explo-
ration rate µ = 0.01, selection strength s = 0.5. In (a) the mobility is m = 0, and in (b) the
strength-of-ties is 1/4. For additional details see [41].
those neighbors (hence high strength-of-ties), while an individual with many connec-
tions has a relatively low number of interactions with a greater variety of individuals
(hence low strength-of-ties). Thus if an individual is located at a node with degree d,
then the strength-of-ties to each of the individual’s neighbors is 1/d.
• Residential mobility. Residential mobility [35] is the degree to which humans are able
to change their location, and, as a result, their position within the social network
within a population. Some human populations, particularly those that are individual-
istic, have very high mobility where people can easily exit the group, whereas others,
particularly collectivistic cultures, are much more dependent on others and are less
able to easily exit the group [34, 42, 43]. We implemented a simple model of residen-
tial mobility using a probability m with which, at the beginning of each generation,
an individual would switch position with a randomly chosen other individual in the
population.
We ran a large number of EGT simulations in which we varied the individuals’ average
strength-of-ties and their average mobility. The simulation results confirmed our hypothesis:
the evolution of responsible 3PP depended critically on conditions of high social-structural
constraint, i.e. high average strength-of-ties and low mobility (see Figure 3).
Examination of the results showed that when responsible 3PP evolves, it does so as an
ultimately non-altruistic trait. The behavior acts as a signal to potential co-players in the
neighborhood that non-cooperation will not be tolerated. High strength-of-ties and low
mobility allow clustered agents engaging in responsible 3PP to induce cooperation in their
neighborhood. By inducing such local cooperation, clusters of 3PP agents increase their
own payoff and spread. This leads to the emergence of responsible 3PP in the population
as a whole. By contrast, low strength-of-ties and high mobility prevent 3PP agents from
inducing a local culture of cooperation, and hence responsible 3PP does not evolve.
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3.2 Societal Threat and the Strength of Social Norms
The strength of social norms varies widely around the globe. For example there is consider-
able cross-cultural variation in norms for fairness, cooperation, and the willingness to punish
to enforce such norms [3, 18, 25, 26]; and there is evidence that these variations are related
to the degree of threat to the society—which can include manmade threats such as threats
of invasions, low natural resources (e.g., food supply), and high degrees of natural disasters
such as floods, cyclones, and droughts [9, 33, 18]. What has been unclear is whether the de-
gree of threat might actually require stronger norms and associated punishment of deviance
in order to survive under high threat—or more generally, whether differences in punishment
across societies have any evolutionary basis.
We now describe a study in which we used EGT modeling to explore whether higher
levels of threat cause stronger norms of cooperation, with higher punishment of deviance, to
be evolutionarily adaptive (see [41] for details). We studied both cooperative norms (as in
Section 2.3) and coordination norms (where individuals need to coordinate their actions in
order to accomplish something). Below we discuss only the former; for the latter, see [41].
For cooperative norms, our EGT model was similar to one in Section 2.3. Individuals
interacted in a PGG with a contribution phase and a punishment phase. However, we made
the following modifications:
• Our previous study (the one in Section 3.1) having convinced us of the importance
of geographically constraining the individuals on a network, we also did that here.
However, we didn’t need to vary degree of the nodes this time, so we used a simple
grid, which is the kind of network that’s used the most frequently in EGT studies
[22, 23].
• The contribution strategies were the same as in Section 3.1: Cooperation, Defection,
and Opportunism, where the latter strategy looks at the punishment reputations of the
individual’s neighbors, and decides whether to cooperate by looking at the expected
payoffs for cooperating and defecting.
As a measure of the norm strength in a population, we used the percentage of agents who
adhere to the norm, and the proportion of punishers.
To implement the notion of societal threat, we started by giving all individuals a base
payoff from the environment, to capture the notion that our game models just one of the
many kinds of interactions that individuals might have in a more realistic world. Then we
subtracted an amount τ from this base payoff, to model the level of threat. Since threats like
drought, hurricanes, tornadoes, famine, or hostile invasions all can reasonably be assumed
to reduce the general payoff that agents in a population receive from their environment,
this captures the essential effect of a broad array of threats. For instance, ecological threats
are related to the availability of natural resources in that they often diminish agricultural
yields and engender food shortages [38], and managing them often requires the use of the
population’s resources.
After each individual receives its base payoff and the payoffs from the contribution
and punishment phases, the total acquired payoff p is transformed to reproductive fitness
through a fitness function f(p) = 1 − e−0.1p, which is intended to capture the principle of
diminishing marginal utility: increased payoffs produce diminishing marginal increases in
fitness, e.g., the fifth meal of a day is not as important to an agent’s fitness or wellbeing
as the first. There is an abundance of evidence across disciplines that increased resources
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Figure 4: Long-term average proportions of cooperation (at left) and punishment (at right)
strategies under different levels of threat. The graph at left also includes the cooperation
rate, the percentage of actions in the game that are cooperation. To attain long-term
average proportions, we ran simulations for 5000 timesteps and averaged the population
proportions over all timesteps. Each data point in the plot is the average of 50 simulation
runs. Error bars show standard deviation. Model parameters are r = 3, c = 1, λ = 1/2,
ρ = 3/2, µ = 0.1, d = 0.1, base-pay = 30. Note higher Responsible Punishers (R) and
higher cooperation by Opportunistic (O) and Cooperator (C) agents under higher threat
levels. For additional details see [41].
lead to diminishing increases in utility [12, 13, 16], and diminishing-returns fitness functions
have been used in several other EGT studies [16, 19, 21].
We ran EGT simulations with the above model to test the hypothesis that exposure to
threat is an important causal factor in the emergence of strong norms under the evolutionary
pressures of cultural adaptation. If exposure to threat is indeed a cause of the emergence
of strong norms, agents that adhere to the norm and enforce the norm through punishment
should thrive evolutionarily under higher threat, while other agents that do not enforce the
norm should not fare well evolutionarily. In contrast, under lower threat, we would expect
the evolutionary pressures to allow for a greater variety of strategies and less norm-enforcing
punishers. The results (see Figure 4) confirm this hypothesis.
3.3 Why Has Ethnocentrism Decreased?
Almost all current and historical conflicts around the world can be characterized by individ-
uals defining themselves and others in terms of their group membership. This is supported
by substantial empirical evidence that show that individuals have a natural tendency to-
wards ethnocentrism, i.e., to favor in-group members, while being hostile towards out-group
individuals [7, 8, 27]. Several EGT studies have also shown that group-biased behavior
among individuals emerges readily and dominantly in populations comprised of various
groups [2, 17, 22].
Although these studies might seem to indicate that ethnocentric behavior among humans
is inevitable, statistics show that over the past few centuries of human civilization, violence
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and out-group conflict have declined dramatically. It occurred to us that the seeming dis-
connect between these statistics and the research literature might be resolved by examining
how residential mobility (see Section 3.1) affects the evolution of ethnocentrism. Below we
summarize our EGT study on this topic; the details are described in [10].
Classic sociological and psychological theory suggests that in high-mobility contexts, in-
dividuals form new relationships and sever unwanted ones with great ease, and are more
open towards strangers—but in low-mobility contexts, individuals have fewer opportunities
to form new relationships, and severing existing relationships can lead to being ostracized
from one’s only social circle [36, 31]. Thus we hypothesized that residential mobility might
counteract the evolution of ethnocentrism, by discouraging group-entitative behavior (in
which one’s behavior toward others depends primarily on what groups they are in) and
encouraging individual-entitative behavior (in which one reacts to others primarily as indi-
viduals rather than as members of a particular group).
For our model, we began with the one in Hammond and Axelrod’s pioneering EGT study
of ethnocentrism [22]. In their model, agents were located on a grid, and interacted with
their immediate neighbors. Each agent had a perceivable group tag to identify what group
it was in, and each agent i could behave differently toward in-group members (members of
i’s group) and out-group members(members of other groups). At each iteration, each agent
had a Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction with each of its immediate neighbors. The possible
strategies were CC (cooperate with both in-group and out-group members), CD (cooperate
with in-group and defect with out-group), DC (defect with in-group and cooperate with
out-group), and DD (defect with both in-group and and out-group). In their study, they
tested a wide range of parameter settings, and in each case ethnocentrism (modeled by the
CD strategy) became predominant.
To test our hypothesis, we needed to modify Hammond and Axelrod’s model to introduce
mobility. Furthermore, in their model, all of an agent’s interactions were group-entitative,
and we needed to introduce the possibility of individual-entitative behavior. To accomplish
this, we made the following modifications:
• We implemented mobility as in Section 3.1: we used a probability m with which, at
the beginning of each generation, an individual would switch position with a randomly
chosen other individual in the population.
• Each individual could either be group-entitative, i.e. base their actions solely on what
the group an individual is in, or individual-entitative, i.e., base their actions on knowl-
edge of each individual rather than their group tag.
• The action of a group-entitative individual i towards an individual j depended only
on i’s last encounter with anyone from j’s group. Thus, i had two possibly different
strategies: one for in-groups and another for out-groups. Each of those strategies was
one of the following: AllC (always cooperate), AllD (always defect), TFT (Tit-for-
Tat: play whatever action the opponent played in i’s last interaction with anyone from
j’s group), or OTFT (play the opposite of what TFT would play).
• The action of an individual-entitative agent i depended only on its last encounter
specifically with agent j, ignoring j’s group tag. Thus, i could have one of the above
four strategies, except that TFT and OTFT depended on i’s last interaction with j
specifically, rather than someone in j’s group.
The results of our EGT simulations (see Figure 5) confirmed our hypothesis. With low
mobility (low values of m), groups tended to cluster together heavily, i.e., agents interacted
11
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Proportions of agents and actions as a function of mobility, after 30000 iterations.
Each data point is an average of 100 simulation runs. The plots show the proportions of
(a) the group-entitative and individual-entitative agents, and (b) the actions played by the
agents. For additional details see [10].
primarily with in-group members. Thus, group-entitative strategies (in-group cooperation
and out-group hostility) were profitable in terms of payoffs and ethnocentric behavior be-
came evolutionarily dominant. However, as we increased m, ethnocentrism decreased. In-
dividuals were more likely to interact with out-group members, and hence couldn’t rely
on high payoffs from in-group interactions. Thus, individual-entitative strategies became
evolutionarily dominant with strategies like TFT gaining prominence.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we have discussed how evolutionary game theory can be used as a framework
for studying the evolution of cultural norms, and have described the modeling decisions
that we made in three EGT studies of the evolution of cultural norms. These studies have
helped to establish support for causal relationships between several structural factors—
strength-of-ties, residential mobility, and societal threat—and societal traits such as third-
party punishment, norm enforcement, and ethnocentrism.
At this point, some readers might be pondering the following question: why did we use
EGT for these studies, rather than conventional game theory?
Conventional game theory is good for analyzing situations where we know the individuals’
preferences, and want to predict what they will do based on those preferences. But in our
work, we wanted to know how these preferences arose. We were interested in the following
kinds of questions:
• What kinds of structural and external factors might have led to the emergence of
behaviors we see among individuals in a society?
• What evolutionary pressures might have led to variations in those behaviors?
• Can they be validated by observed phenomena?
12
Conventional game theory wouldn’t have answered those questions. To lay out an individ-
ual’s preferences in a conventional game-theoretic model would, in essence, be building into
the model the very traits whose emergence we were wondering about. We instead needed
to lay out the structural/environmental factors that might be responsible for the evolution
of those traits, to see whether those traits would evolve.
These results also illustrate how an interdisciplinary team—in this case, computer scien-
tists and psychologists—can achieve results that couldn’t have been done without coopera-
tion among participants from both disciplines. The work required a strong understanding
of both psychological principles and computational and mathematical modeling techniques.
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